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Abstract
The article highlights some of the parallels encountered in the areas of mindfulness and 
first-person scientific approaches to research into consciousness. It thus considers the 
possibilities of using mindfulness as a scientific method in the area of cognitive science. 
We are well aware that both first-person research approaches in cognitive science and 
mindfulness as a type of Buddhist practice are intertwined with certain conceptual frame-
works. This calls for a careful consideration of their individual characteristics, which may 
gain completely different meanings outside of their primary contexts. Since the concept 
of mindfulness has been a part of Western thinking for some time now, especially in the 
area of therapy, we believe it is necessary for a critical reflection on the possibilities of both 
of these areas to inspire each other. We touch upon some of the important epistemolog-
ical and methodological questions, and point out some of the problems common to both 
empirical first-person research and Buddhist methods of contemplation of experience. 
More specifically, this work examines the problem of limited scope of insight, the sub-
ject-object split and excavation fallacy, the problem of researching everyday experience, 
and the issue of horizon. We also consider the question of research intention in both 
science and Buddhism. The conclusion gives some suggestions as to how these two areas 
might mutually benefit one another. We also point out the ethical aspects that Buddhism 
might contribute to scientific research, and the open-endedness that science could con-
tribute to Buddhism and other spiritual practices.
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Izvleček
Članek osvetljuje nekatere vzporednice, ki jih lahko najdemo med prakso čuječnosti 
in prvoosebnimi znanstvenimi pristopi k raziskovanju doživljanja. Gre za razmislek o 
možnosti uporabe čuječnosti kot raziskovalne metode na področju kognitivne znanosti. 
Upoštevano je, da so tako pristopi prvoosebnega raziskovanja v kognitivni znanosti, kot 
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tudi čuječnost kot praksa v budizmu, vpeti v določen konceptualni in kulturni okvir. To 
nedvomno zahteva veliko previdnost pri obravnavi posameznih značilnosti, ki lahko zu-
naj svojega konteksta dobijo drug pomen. Uporaba čuječnosti je že nekaj časa tudi del 
zahodnih pristopov, predvsem v terapiji, zato je dobrodošel kritičen razmislek o možnosti 
medsebojnega oplajanja obeh področij. Prispevek se dotakne nekaterih pomembnih epis-
temoloških in metodoloških vprašanj in opozori na nekatere probleme, ki so skupni em-
piričnemu prvoosebnemu raziskovanju in budističnim metodam zrenja doživljanja: pro-
blem omejenega spoznavnega dosega, problem razcepa med objektom in subjektom v t. i. 
napaki izkopavanja, problem raziskovanja vsakdanjega doživljanja in vprašanje horizonta 
spoznanja. Obravnavano je še vprašanje namere raziskovanja v znanosti in v budizmu. 
Zaključek nakaže, na kakšen način bi ti dve področji lahko sodelovali drugo z drugim. 
Izpostavljeni so etični vidiki, ki jih lahko znanstvenemu raziskovanju prispeva budizem, in 
odprta naravnanost, ki jo budizmu in duhovnim šolam lahko doprinese znanost. 
Ključne besede: čuječnost, fenomenologija, prvoosebno raziskovanje, etika, kognitivna 
znanost
Introduction
The article highlights some of the parallels encountered in the areas of mindful-
ness and first-person scientific approaches to research into consciousness. It con-
siders the possibilities of using mindfulness as a scientific method in the area of 
cognitive science. We are well aware that both first-person research approaches in 
cognitive science and mindfulness as a type of Buddhist practice are intertwined 
with given conceptual frameworks. This calls for a very careful consideration of 
their individual characteristics which may gain completely different meanings 
outside of their primary contexts. Since the concept of mindfulness has been a 
part of Western thinking for some time now, especially in the area of therapy, we 
believe it is necessary for a critical reflection on the possibilities of both of these 
areas to inspire each other.
Interest in the possible applications of Buddhist meditation in the areas of psychi-
atry and psychotherapy can be found as early as 1982, when Jon Kabat-Zinn first 
suggested using an adapted version of Buddhist mindfulness meditation (sati) 
for psychiatric purposes (Kabat-Zinn 1982). In recent years, this interest has wit-
nessed a rise in intensity, as well as expansion to other areas (e.g. education). This 
has led to the various approaches to the application of mindfulness techniques in 
the context of therapy. Despite the relatively wide array of these, all such methods 
share a common assumption that mindfulness can be considered as a technique, 
i.e. a procedure that can be learned and can bring a person to a given beneficial 
155Asian Studies IV (XX), 2 (2016), pp. 153–168
goal (which is not necessarily the state of mindfulness as described in Buddhist 
texts). There is also another, even more important assumption shared by Western 
versions of mindfulness––all of them seem to believe that this practice will be 
effective, even though it has been separated from the context of Buddhist practice 
and belief.
Parallel to this interest in the secular use of mindfulness as a therapeutic tech-
nique we can notice the voices from scientists who have been pointing out for 
decades that Buddhist meditation, and the insights gained from it, might be used 
in research into consciousness, or more widely––the psyche. Among the more 
famous supporters of such a merger of the two fields we can find Francisco Varela, 
Antoine Lutz, Natalie Depraz, Alan Wallace and Jonathan Shear. Moreover, and 
as seen from his recent publications, Kabat-Zinn himself has joined the ranks 
of such writers, talking about the “science of mindfulness” (Paulson et al. 2013). 
Similar to the use of mindfulness in therapy, its potential applications in scientific 
research also appear to be very diverse. Some researchers even suggest that it is 
necessary to study abhidhamma (the so-called Buddhist psychology) in order to 
gain new data for Western science. In neuroscience we can find proposals to use 
trained meditators as (better quality) subjects in neuropsychological research, as 
it is anticipated that they could use their skill in controlling their mental states 
to increase the credibility of neurological measurements (Barinaga 2003). A third 
group of suggestions (Varela, Rosch and Thompson 1992) sees meditation as a 
potential way of gathering phenomenological data, and it is this last possibility 
that the current study focuses on.
In the paper we touch upon some of the important epistemological and meth-
odological obstacles and questions encountered in using mindfulness as a path 
to scientific insight into consciousness. We point out some of the problems com-
mon to both empirical first-person research and Buddhist methods of contem-
plation of experience. Among these the most pertinent are the problems of lim-
ited scope of insight, the subject-object split and excavation fallacy, the problem 
of researching everyday experience, and the question of horizon. The paper goes 
on to discuss the parallels and differences related to the more general question of 
research intentions in science and Buddhism. The conclusion gives some sugges-
tions as to how these two areas might be able to benefit one another. We high-
light the ethical aspects that Buddhism might contribute to scientific research, 
and the open-endedness that science could contribute to Buddhism and other 
spiritual practices. 
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Empirical First-person Research and Some of the Problems Shared 
by Buddhist Techniques of Inquiry
The first part of this study, comparing the approaches of contemporary cognitive 
science to the framework of Buddhist ways of understanding consciousness, will 
be dedicated to a comparison of methodological problems encountered by West-
ern techniques of gathering first-person data and those applied in the practice of 
mindfulness. The discussion will be grounded in the definition of mindfulness as 
(an attempt at) non-judgmental awareness of one’s own experience in the present 
moment. This definition has been accepted by most Western researchers, despite 
the fact that Buddhist teachers often warn about the incompleteness of such un-
derstanding (the meanings of the Pāli notion of sati or the Sanskrit notion of smr �-
ti are much more complex), and the unclear distinction between the phenomenon 
(is mindfulness a state?) and process (or is it a technique?). 
If we follow the proposed general definition, mindfulness emerges as a promising 
tool in research into experience. Its advocates (e.g. Lutz, Varela, Depraz, Wallace 
and Shear) see it as a potential upgrade of the existing methods in the area of 
first-person research––an area in which any methodological reinforcement could 
come in very handy in its ongoing struggle for existence and recognition. We be-
lieve that these issues overlap to a great extent with the (relatively old) question 
about the relevance and scope of introspection in Western science. This is the rea-
son we start off with a short overview of the attempts of inquiry into lived human 
experience and the problems which put the use of introspection as a scientific 
method into question. 
Western science has mainly focused on what Locke and Galileo called primary 
qualities––parts of the world which are “solid”, observer-independent and quan-
titatively describable. Nevertheless, one can detect periods of increased interest in 
subjective phenomena that seem to enter the domain of Western science in waves. 
The transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries led not only to ex-
traordinary progress in physics and chemistry, but also to one of the strongest and 
most varied attempts at the scientific understanding of lived experience. The po-
tential of introspective research was considered by the philosopher William James 
and the Kyoto School of philosophy, founded in the tradition of Zen Buddhism. 
Sigmund Freud carried out research into the mind through the analysis of mental 
disorders, but it was probably the German Introspectionists who most faithfully 
followed the model and assumptions of natural science in their efforts. Wilhelm 
Wundt aimed to prepare in his Leipzig Experimental Laboratory a research pro-
gram that would allow for as precise a definition of experiential variables as pos-
sible, and also enable later replicability. In selecting the techniques used for his 
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research into the psyche, Wundt followed in the shoes of the physiologist Gustav 
Fechner, but focused on a type of introspection (albeit in a very tentative and 
controlled manner). Wundt’s protégée, Edward Titchener, introduced the idea 
of this kind of psychological research to the United States, even though he did 
not follow his master’s ideas to the letter. Indeed, important differences between 
the two soon became apparent in their views on the scope of introspection as a 
research technique, and also on the generalisability of data gained by it (Schwitz-
gebel 2014).
This dissent among introspectionists merely emphasized the problems already en-
countered by established scientific methodology when trying to deal with intro-
spection. As such, the list of problems which had been addressed by philosophers 
since the beginning of such investigation was extended by new ones, related to 
the attempts at empirically researching lived experience (cf. Dunlap’s criticism 
in his article; Dunlap 1912). Even though such criticism and the marked success 
of behaviourism served to reduce the level of trust in introspective data for many 
years, we now are witnessing a comeback of introspection into science. In recent 
decades there has been a new wave of interest in first-person research, mostly 
parallel to the development of cognitive science. Several new research approach-
es based on introspection have thus been developed that use introspection as a 
principal source of gaining data about the mind and consciousness (Overgaard, 
Gallagher and Ramsøy 2011). But despite this return (Barinaga 2003), the status 
of introspection in science is still far from clear, and to a great extent it remains 
controversial (Schooler and Schreiber 2004).
This renewal of interest in first-person data is mostly due to necessity––the mind 
can only be explored “from the outside” to a certain extent, beyond which first-per-
son data becomes indispensable. Expanding the scope of first-person research has 
therefore re-opened questions related to such approaches. Very good overviews 
of the problems of introspective methods can be found in papers by Bitbol and 
Petitmengin (2013), Chalmers (2004), as well as Wooffitt and Holt (2011). In the 
follow section we will focus on some of the questions applicable to first-person 
techniques or mindfulness as a way of gaining insights into consciousness.
The Limited Scope of Insight
The most well-known (and most often quoted) criticism of introspection is that 
given in Nisbett and Wilson (1977), with this research report claiming that our 
insights into our own mental processes are extremely limited, and our reports thus 
tend to be based principally on (mostly false) beliefs about motives of our actions. 
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More recent research warns us about overestimating the value of introspection in 
everyday judgements (Pronin 2006), and in describing the reasons for our deci-
sions ( Johansson et al. 2006). 
Bitbol and Petitmengin (2013) conclude that many of these problems spring 
from unclarified definitions and the application of inappropriate epistemological 
grounds. The above-mentioned studies, for example, do not explore introspection 
at all but rather the interpretations that people give to their experience. This shows 
that all of these researchers share common (unreflected) epistemological assump-
tions: they have no doubt that any kind of experience is always an experience of 
something. By accepting such an assumption it is possible to attempt to measure 
the correctness and validity of experience, and thus assess its scope and precision, 
by comparing it to that which is being experienced as measured in an intersubjec-
tively verifiable way. It was (among others) Edmund Husserl who recognised and 
articulated our everyday assumption that experience reflects reality, independent 
of observation. He named it the natural (or everyday) attitude. His own method 
of research into experience was based on actively bracketing such an attitude. The 
act of phenomenological reduction is the act of bracketing all meanings, interpre-
tations and explanations, and as such the act of allowing (accepting) experience 
such as it shows itself to us regardless what it is the experience of. 
Husserl thought contemplation of experience to be a special experiential capacity. 
He opposed the term introspection, which was in his time used by the above-men-
tioned school of experimental psychologists, and dubbed the phenomenological 
way of contemplating experience as phenomenological reduction. Despite the fact 
that Husserl’s phenomenological project remained limited to philosophy instead 
of growing into a transcendental science that would represent the foundation of 
all natural science (as he envisioned it), his methodological guidelines are today 
widely accepted in modern techniques of first-person research (Varela and Shear 
1999). Moreover, in spite of Husserl’s (well-founded) reluctance, the term intro-
spection is today often used in the sense of phenomenological reduction (Bitbol 
and Petitimengin 2013), although Depraz, Varela and Vermersch (2003) suggest 
the term gesture of becoming aware to designate the same process. 
The gesture of becoming aware is supposed to be a gesture of turning our attention 
away from interpreting experience (i.e. what are we experiencing?) to the con-
templation of present experience as an assemblage of experiential nuances such 
as they show themselves to us. The gesture of becoming aware is an act directly 
opposed to our everyday attitude––the attitude which is all the time directing our 
attention towards the world, its content and meanings. For example, when I am 
thinking intensively about my meeting tomorrow, the everyday attitude focuses 
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the attention towards the content––what will I say, what is important, and so on. 
The act of phenomenological reduction consists of diverting our attention towards 
the how?––it represents an insight into the manner in which thoughts and the 
feelings related to them emerge. Depraz, Varela and Vermersch (2003) believe 
that, if understood this way, there is no essential difference between the gesture of 
becoming aware and mindfulness. Thus they include vipassana meditation among 
the techniques of carrying out the gesture of becoming aware. If such a view is 
accepted, it follows that the questions related to introspection (in the wider sense 
of the term) as a scientific tool also apply to the potential use of mindfulness in 
the context of scientific research. 
From the position of research based on phenomenological reduction (i.e. bracket-
ing our beliefs about reality) it is possible to do away with some of the problems 
set out above, noted by Nisbett and Wilson (1977). If we give up interpreting 
experience and comparing it to third-person data, then these problems become 
irrelevant. In the same vein we can also deal with any questions that arise about 
the limited scope of introspective methods, as it is fairly obvious that all of these 
are in fact questions about the compatibility of such methods with third-person 
behavioural-physiological theories of the mind (see also Strle 2013). But if we 
attempt to view the experiential landscape as primary, as suggested by Husserl, 
than the “outside” objective world can no longer be the frame of reference for 
the validity of experiential data. However, this does not mean that both of these 
perspectives might not effectively collaborate (on equal grounds), as proposed by 
Varela in his neurophenomenological project (1996).
The Subject-Object Split and Excavation Fallacy
It would appear that most descriptions of introspection encompass two levels: 
somebody who is observing and that which is being observed. At the second, 
meta level there is a subject who is following a first-level mental process (which is 
supposed to be independent of the act of introspection). Such a view necessarily 
begs the question well known to any practitioners of Zen meditation: who (or 
rather––where) is the observer and what (where) is the observed?
Bitbol and Petitmengin (2013) warn us that such a notion of introspection is 
grounded in the dualistic division of the world into “the outside” and “the inside”, 
according to which introspection observes the inner goings-on in the same way as 
natural science observes the outside. But in a different epistemological framework, 
the one that does not accept dualistic and representational assumptions about 
introspection, the problems of division into subject and object and the problem 
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of deformation of experience due to observation (the so-called excavation fallacy; 
Depraz et al. 2003) are seen in a different light. Related to this, Bitbol and Petit-
mengin (2013) propose an alternative understanding of the gesture of becoming 
aware (i.e. introspection in the wider sense of the term, which also includes mind-
fulness): not as a dual split into meta-awareness and the observed phenomeno-
logical phenomenon, but as a new, independent and wholesome experience. The 
mindful reflection of any experience is thus an active process which creates a new 
experience. 
The interdependence of experiential data and the process by which they are gained 
is analogous to the well-known situation in quantum mechanics where a meas-
ured quantity does not exist independently of the process of measurement. Bitbol 
and Petitmengin (2013) quote a proposal made by Niels Bohr that the idea of 
quantum mechanical measurement disturbing the measured phenomenon would 
be more appropriate if redefined as a co-definition of the phenomenon by the 
conditions of measurement: measuring thus does not deform the phenomenon 
but rather co-determines it. In our definition of introspection we also refute the 
notion of experiential data as something that exists in itself and can be corrupted 
in the act of introspection. On the contrary, the state of such data is determined in 
the process of introspection itself. Any objection that introspection deforms expe-
riential data thus loses force, as introspection actually co-determines experience. 
By analogy, mindfulness is itself a new type of experience. As such it has special 
status, albeit not in the sense that Dunlap thought it to have. Its particularity lies 
not in achieving some special detachment between the observed experience and 
the observer, nor in a special epistemic position that would allow mindfulness 
more cognitive access compared to other types of experience. What makes it par-
ticular is its intent: everyday, unreflected experience focuses on the content which 
is being brought forth, thus ignoring the manner of its emergence. The gesture of 
becoming aware brackets all content and interpretations, while replacing belief 
into what is being perceived, observed, considered or felt by an interest in the 
manner of the emergence of such content. Bitbol and Petitimengin (2013) believe 
that the process of phenomenological reduction actually implies an expansion of 
the scope of experience. Accordingly, it can be expected that training in mindful-
ness would further “expand” the array of potential experience.
Impossibility of Research into Everyday Experience
Perhaps rather than talking about “expanding” the array of experience, it is more 
appropriate to talk about a change in the experiential landscape or even about 
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“becoming conscious differently” (Petranker 2003). Such a change (from the 
everyday state to an “altered” state of consciousness) is the trademark of most 
spiritual practices. If the basic characteristic of inquiry into experience lies in 
reaching new experiential states, this raises the question if it is at all possible to 
explore everyday experiential states by using this type of observation.
Interestingly enough, phenomenological research is in a very similar position to 
mindfulness practice in relation to this issue. Husserl’s method directs the re-
searcher to bracket her everyday beliefs about the nature of the world (by per-
forming phenomenological reduction). The resulting experience differs from 
everyday, non-reflected experience.
It seems that Husserl himself was well aware of this problem. Beyer describes this 
as the following “two-horned” dilemma: 
If, on the one hand, the phenomenologist leaves the “natural attitude” and 
brackets his corresponding existence-belief, he cannot at the same time 
perform the perceptual experience he wishes to investigate. (This is the 
first horn of the dilemma.) […] If, on the other hand, our phenomenol-
ogist makes use of that belief, then he is bound to violate the constraints 
put upon him by the local epoché: he cannot but fail to assume the phe-
nomenological attitude. (This is the second horn.) (Beyer 2013)
The application of reduction essentially changes the experiential landscape. Thus 
it is hard to imagine either mindfulness or phenomenological reduction to be a 
“measurement tool” for observing everyday (non-reflected) experience. 
It would appear that the answer we might give to this “problem” of phenome-
nological observation is similar to that given by Buddhists: it is not important 
to observe superficial experiential phenomena as they appear to non-reflective 
observers, as real research into experience must be directed towards inter- and 
intra-subjective asymptotes. While deeper reflection does indeed change superfi-
cial layers of experience, it might nevertheless preserve (and even emphasise) the 
invariants, which are essential for understanding consciousness. But there is also 
one other possibility: research that is carried out using the tool of mindfulness 
research might (beside invariants) also bring us to understand experiential pos-
sibilities which Western science is not even aware of (or has only a very unclear 
notion of under the broad term “mystical experiences”).
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Horizon
Husserl (in Bitbol and Petitmengin 2013) believed the perception of any object 
in the world to be incompletely given and always marked by the so-called hori-
zon––the observer’s array of expectations about important aspects of the observed 
phenomenon. Along the lines of interpretation set out by Bitbol and Petitmengin 
(2013), we consider that the reflection of experience, just as with any case of look-
ing to “the outside”, demands the adoption of a horizon. The horizons of intro-
spection are conglomerates of factors (such as the related conceptual framework 
and communication situation) which co-form sequences of experiential steps 
leading to the formation of beliefs about an experience. 1
To what extent does the Buddhists’ conceptual framework define their beliefs 
about the experience of meditators? And by analogy––to what extent does the 
conceptual framework of a phenomenologist define her research results? It has to 
be emphasized that horizon is not considered to be unfortunate distortions of ex-
perience, but are rather accepted as the intrinsic characteristic of any newly formed 
experience. To recall the above-mentioned analogy from quantum physics: hori-
zons of introspection are perceived as a characteristic of both the measurement 
instrument and the act of measuring itself, indistinguishable from the measured 
phenomenon which they thus do not contaminate but rather co-determine. 
By taking this into account, the question arises as to whether a Buddhist and a 
phenomenologist are making the same kind of measurement (or at least compa-
rable ones)? Is it possible that persistent long-term research might bring both of 
them to discover the same invariants, or are they staring into completely different 
horizons?
These views and reflections relate to research into experience itself and the ways 
of “measuring” it. In the following section we touch upon the parallels and differ-
ences relating to the more general issues of research intentions in Buddhism and 
science.
The Path to Salvation and/or Curiosity
The mindfulness meditation that Buddhism has been fostering for over two thou-
sand years offers us a first-person approach, which has been missing from sci-
ence which handles research from a third-person point of view. We have already 
1 A more detailed analysis of the factors contributing to the horizon of introspection can be found 
in Kordeš and Demšar (2016).
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mentioned that Depraz, Varela and Vermersch (2003) listed vipassana meditation 
among the techniques of gesture of becoming aware. But since it is a technique 
which appeared in a very different context, this brings up new questions connect-
ed to the relationship between science and religious/spiritual practice (see Vörös 
2016 for a discussion of similar questions). 
In recent years the fourteenth Dalai Lama has been very active in representing 
Buddhism and its role in society. By encouraging dialogue between scientists and 
Buddhist monks (cf. Mind and Life Dialogues) he is trying to promote an opti-
mistic attitude in which Buddhism and science could be compatible and might 
even attain a kind of synthesis. In the introduction to his book The Universe in a 
Single Atom: The Convergence of Science and Spirituality, he writes: 
My confidence in venturing into science lies in my basic belief that as in 
science so in Buddhism, understanding the nature of reality is pursued 
by means of critical investigation: if scientific analysis were conclusively 
to demonstrate certain claims in Buddhism to be false, then we must 
accept the findings of science and abandon those claims. (Dalai Lama 
2005, 2–3)
But, as mentioned by Flanagan, we must not overlook the reminder the Dalai 
Lama added to this. Referring to Tsonghap (1357–1419), he quotes Thupten 
Jinpa’s observation that it is necessary to distinguish between “what is negated 
through scientific method and what has not been observed through such a meth-
od”, or put in other words, we must not conflate the processes of “not finding 
something” and “finding its nonexistence” (Flanagan 2011, 62–63). This way Bud-
dhists can, for example, continue to believe in reincarnation, since science has not 
yet definitely proved that it does not exist. We might even argue that such definite 
proof could not be given, since irrefutable proof is hard to come by outside for-
mal logic and mathematics. But this does not imply that everything is allowed, 
since empirical sciences also take into account inductive reasoning, generalization, 
probability and statistical explanations.
Even though both Buddhism and science underline the need for research, pro-
ceeding from our understanding of these two areas it could be said that one of 
the most important differences between them lies in the fact that Buddhists ac-
cept that Buddha in his enlightenment completely understood the nature of re-
ality. How could science possibly have anything to add to that? It thus might 
make more sense to say that Buddhism and science represent two different ar-
eas: Buddha dealt with the ultimate truth––how to liberate yourself from the 
cycle of rebirth and attain complete freedom (nibbāna), while science deals with 
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conventional truth and the everyday world, allowing for deeper insight into its 
functioning. But as Lopez (2008) suggested in his analysis of the relationship 
between Buddhism and science, this division is not as simple as it might seem, 
since both of these traditions have contributed much to both of these areas. How 
should we understand mindfulness in light of this?
Buddha described his quest for the path to spiritual freedom in the Four Noble 
Truths. While the first three truths represent theory, the fourth one is a meth-
od of practice leading to deep practical experience of the first three truths. This 
combination of theoretical knowledge and practical experience should bring us to 
experiential wisdom allowing for “a direct, deep and intuitive level of perception 
that lies beyond any thought, concept or idea” (Pečenko 2014, 38) and bringing 
us towards enlightenment. Mindfulness can thus be regarded as being a kind 
of research on mental states, and in fact an important compendium of texts en-
titled Abhidhamma-pitaka was written dedicated to insights about the mind, a 
kind of phenomenological overview of mental states and processes (Bohdi and 
Bomhard 2007). Nevertheless the main motivation for pursuing mindfulness does 
not spring from theoretical curiosity, but rather the practical purpose of Buddha’s 
teaching––liberation from suffering. This is why in our opinion one of the main 
differences between Buddhism and science lies in the goal when using meditation. 
Unlike scientists, Buddhists do not practice mindfulness out of pure curiosity, it 
has a soteriological character. Getting to know deeper and deeper layers of the 
mind serves the purpose of facing constant suffering (dukkha) and learning about 
its origins, which leads to the ultimate liberation.
We could agree that the motivation of many scientists considering fundamental 
questions in the area of natural science, as well as in that of the human mind, is 
mostly a desire to discover the unknown and get to know the truth, or at least 
come closer to it. But it is also possible to argue against such an idealized vision of 
science, in which the fundamental motivation springs from pure curiosity. Let us 
point out two aspects relevant for this discussion. The first is striving for the appli-
cability of knowledge, while the second is related to the existential commitments 
of the researchers themselves.
An overview of scientific practice shows us that throughout history scientific re-
search has often been guided by functional goals––for example, finding a cure for 
Alzheimer’s disease. In order to reach this goal it is necessary to explore the inner 
workings of the brain, since (beside other knowledge) understanding the func-
tioning of our nervous system leads us towards the desired goal. Psychotherapy 
might also be considered in a similar way, as most therapists claim their work to 
be helping their patients towards a deeper understanding of themselves. Does this 
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imply that the exploration of the mind is just a by-product of loosening its inner 
knots? Here we might find parallels to Buddhism. But regardless of the fact that 
scientific research is often directed towards a given (functional) goal, it would ap-
pear that the essential characteristic of science is its open-endedness, as it is driven 
by curiosity rather than distress.
Even if we disregard the intention of applicability, is it really “pure” curiosity that 
drives us to explore? While this might appear to be so for much of science, it is 
nevertheless less certain if this holds true in the case of research into conscious-
ness. Assuming that first-person science is based on the researcher herself, she 
being the one who is experiencing it, then both the gathering of data and self-ex-
ploration imply an existential commitment is being made. It is thus not merely 
curious research into something external, as by entering the process of self-explo-
ration we accept the fact that this practice might change us. In our opinion this 
is similar to the situation in mindfulness, and it is this very element of existential 
commitment that is crucial for the question of ethics in research.
Although we have been critical about not differentiating the role of mindfulness 
in Buddhism and science, this does not imply that important insights cannot be 
obtained. On the contrary, it might be the case that mindfulness being part of the 
Eight-Fold Path could bring us to new insights into the issue of ethics in research. 
As a new apprentice takes to the path of meditative practice, she must first learn 
about right understanding and right thinking (wisdom), and develop the related 
skills––right speaking, right acting and right lifestyle. These are practical mani-
festations of wisdom in everyday life. Understanding the law of karma leads her 
towards a life in which she will strive to avoid any unpleasant consequence of her 
actions. She thus avoids such murder, theft, violence and greed, and rather devel-
ops unselfish love and benevolence. These virtues are being manifested by a right 
lifestyle that leads to inner peace, rather than by actions exploiting other people 
and the environment. As she continues to develop concentration and observation 
of her mind, she deepens her wisdom. Such a path is based upon virtues, upon 
acting correctly in everyday life, and represents a basis for inner development and 
wisdom (Pečenko 2014). We can thus see that in Buddhism it is impossible to 
separate ethics from research, as mindfulness cannot be used merely as a tool for 
exploring consciousness without at the same time developing skills and sympathy. 
It would also be good for science to accept this insight about binding research to 
ethics at its very starting point.
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Final Thoughts
Mindfulness is becoming more and more integrated into Western approaches, es-
pecially in various types of psychotherapy. In this article we focused on some of 
the parallels and differences between mindfulness and first-person approaches to 
research into consciousness in cognitive science. We have mostly considered the 
ways in which mindfulness might contribute to first-person research, but let us now 
conclude with a suggestion about how scientific approaches might enrich spiritual 
schools. The idea is that science can challenge these schools by questioning their 
practices using critical analysis. Open-endedness is the foundation of science, and 
this makes it ready for ever new verifications, dialogues and new horizons of research. 
We thus suggest that this attitude might enrich spiritual practices. In the words of 
the fourteenth Dalai Lama, what impressed him most in science is its international 
character, “their amazing willingness to share knowledge with each other without 
regard for national boundaries” (Dalai Lama 2005, 3). Throughout history, spiritual 
schools have also been inspiring each other, regardless of their national or regional 
contents. Many doubt such mutual enrichment can be obtained between science 
and spiritual practices, seeing both as belonging to separate spheres. In the words of 
Stephen Jay Gould, “each subject has a legitimate magisterium, or domain of teach-
ing authority—and these magisteria do not overlap––‘nonoverlapping magisteria’” 
(ibid. 1997). While such a view might diminish the possibility of conflict, it also 
diminishes the potential for collaboration. If one accepts, as we do, that conscious-
ness and mental processes can also be the subject of scientific research, then the 
distinction between science investigating “the empirical constitution of the universe, 
and religion in the search for proper ethical values and the spiritual meaning of our 
lives” (Gould, 1997), becomes questionable. As we have suggested, Buddhism warns 
us that science should accept the insight about binding research to ethics at its very 
starting point. However, we would also like to point out that scientific open-ended-
ness poses a challenge to Buddhism and other spiritual schools.2
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